Introduction
Since the explosion of research in human genetics some 40 years ago, legal and ethical experts have found it increasingly difficult to balance the societal interests in the advancement of medical science with the participants' interests, concerns and expectations. The landmark decision in Moore v Regents of the University of California 1 -which ruled that tissue donors do not possess property rights in their excised tissue -as well as widespread fears that genetic information may be used for insurance or employment discrimination, have put ownership and confidentiality issues at the forefront of debate. 2 However, factors beyond the commonly 1 Moore v Regents of the University of California 793 P 2d 479, 489-492 (Cal. 1990 ) (holding that a patient whose cell line was patented without his permission had no cause of conversion because he did not retain a sufficient property interest in his cells once they were extracted from his body).
3 research participants seeking redress under present tort doctrine will be left without a remedy, because courts have not recognized a duty of special care outside the therapeutic setting and have not considered dignitary harms to be compensable injuries. In the final part of the paper we suggest two ways in which current tort doctrine could be modified to better protect the dignity of biobank research participants -one involving an expansion of existing remedies and the other concerning the development of a distinct dignitary tort. By way of conclusion, we summarize some of the main implications of the Havasupai case for present-day biobank research practices and the regulatory and legal frameworks that govern them.
Background to the Havasupai case
The Havasupai are a Native American tribe, inhabiting a vast (760 km²) reservation at the bottom of the Grand Canyon, Arizona. Today, the tribe counts about 650 members, nearly all living in or around the remote village of Supai. 4 Since the 1960s, the Havasupai have experienced a rapid increase in the incidence of type 2 diabetes. 5 Dozens of Havasupai diabetics have had their lower limbs amputated or have been forced to leave the canyon for dialysis.
6 4 Official website of the Havasupai Tribe http://www.havasupai-nsn.gov/index.html accessed 22 October 2012. 5 The Havasupai tribe has the fourth highest prevalence of diabetes of any population in the world (46%), three times higher than the statistical average for Native Americans (16%) and more than six times higher than the statistical average for non-Hispanic whites (7% 
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Because diabetes had such a devastating effect on their community, in July 1989 tribal leaders approached John Martin, an anthropology professor from Arizona State University (ASU), to look into its causes. After spending more than a year in Supai in the early 1960s
and writing his PhD on the Havasupai, Martin had developed a strong relationship with them.
He had written extensively on their customs and traditions and made a good academic career out of it. 7 Since the Havasupai, like other Native Americans, were deeply suspicious of exploitation by outsiders and considered their bodies to be sacred, the special trust placed in
Martin proved crucial to overcoming the reluctance of tribe members to participate in the project. 8 Martin suspected that the diabetes epidemic was related to genetics and diet and he contacted genetics professor Therese Ann Markow and nutrition professor Linda Vaughan, both from ASU. Markow was not an expert on diabetes. However, she was ASU's only human geneticist at the time and a rising star, known for her success in winning research grants. Approached to study diabetes, Markow was interested in the prospect of studying the high incidence of schizophrenia that the Havasupai allegedly also suffered from. She would later claim that Martin had lured her into the diabetes project by mentioning that the incidence of schizophrenia was seven times higher than normal and that he could provide her with genealogical and demographic reports dating from 1896. 9 During the preparatory meetings, Markow expressed a desire to include schizophrenia, but was told by Martin that the Havasupai would be unlikely to be interested, at least at this point. However, Markow almost 7 Hart and Sobraske (n 3), Witness Interview Summaries, 153-154. 8 According to his assistant Daniel Benyshek John Martin was the 'only reason why the project worked at all.'
Because he had developed a lot of trust, 'over the course of many informal talks, community and Council meetings, Martin was able to engender unusually high support for the project.' ibid 26.
immediately submitted an application to the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression for a grant to study schizophrenia among the Havasupai. 10 Markow, Martin, and Vaughan designed a diabetes project that they proposed at a meeting of the Havasupai Tribal Council in March 1990: an educational pilot program (for which funding had already been obtained); a summer school at ASU for about 10 Havasupai women, educating them about diabetes and the role of good nutrition in prevention; collection and analysis of blood samples to identify individuals susceptible to the disease; and tests to determine whether there was a clear genetic cause.
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In May 1990, after careful deliberation, the Havasupai Tribal Chair wrote to Martin to confirm that the diabetes project could proceed. However, Markow had already obtained funding for the schizophrenia research, without informing the Havasupai.
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In June 1990, before funding was obtained for the diabetes study, blood draws started on more than 100 Havasupai. Except for Markow and Kevin Zuerlein, the young psychiatrist she had appointed to coordinate the draws, all parties concerned were convinced that they were participating only in diabetes research. The first series of blood draws was in fact paid for with money from the schizophrenia grant. 13 Moreover, Zuerlein was instructed to surreptitiously scan the medical files in the tribal clinic for records of psychiatric distress. 6 Markow insisted on securing a general informed consent from Havasupai blood donors.
Surprisingly, Martin -who meanwhile had learned that Markow had obtained funding to study schizophrenia and claims to have told her again that the Havasupai simply would not be interested -was agreeable to this.
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The consent form was kept deliberately vague, stating that the purpose of the project was to 'study the causes of behavioral/medical disorders'. 16 However, in all dealings with the tribe, only diabetes research was mentioned and individual donors were convinced that research would be limited to this topic. 17 The ASU Institutional Review Board approved
Markow's schizophrenia study in January 1991 and her diabetes study in March 1991, months after work on these projects had begun.
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In July 1991, a second series of blood draws was initiated, which proceeded intermittently until the summer of 1994 and involved an additional 130 members of the Havasupai. 19 According to Daniel Benyshek, an assistant of Martin who coordinated these blood draws, no written informed consent was sought. 20 He would later claim to have been 15 ibid 155. 16 Hart and Sobraske (n 3), Investigative Findings, 58.
17 Ibid 50-52. 18 Ibid 24. 19 According to Benyshek's records more than one third of the tribe members donated blood specimens. The Hart report could only ascertain 208 Havasupai blood donors. See Hart and Sobraske (n 3), Witness Interview Summaries, 25, 30, 175, Investigative Findings, 2. 20 Hart and Sobraske (n 3), Witness Interview Summaries, 31, 35. When confronted with Benyshek's statement, Markow reacted in a curious way. She indicated that he had obtained written consent forms from every participant but that she had lost the file containing them when she moved from ASU to the University of Arizona (UA) in the mid-1990s. However, in the same interview she said that she was surprised when she learned that Benyshek had not obtained signed consents and that she felt that he must have been aware of the need to secure 7 advised by Charlotte Beauty, the Havasupai nurse performing the blood draws, that the written consent documents would confuse the tribal members and that providing purely oral information would be more convincing. The information Benyshek provided to the tribal members focused only on diabetes and emphasized that, with a view to better treatment and prevention, blood samples would be analyzed in order to understand how diabetes passed from one generation to another.
Soon after it started, the diabetes-genetic study was put on the backburner. Analysis of the blood samples and the medical files of the Indian Health Service clinic in Supai had
shown that the Havasupai indeed had an extremely high incidence of type 2 diabetes, affecting 38% of the men and 55% of the women over the age of 35. However, the ASU researchers concluded that the incidence of diabetes had risen too quickly to be related to be truly informed, this kind of research still fell under the scope of the project described in the written consent document signed by the participants in the first series of blood draws.
However, that was no longer the case when, a few years later, the focus changed to population migration. After Markow had moved from ASU to the University of Arizona (UA) and had taken the Havasupai blood samples with her, she provided samples to UA researchers with a keen interest in ancient population migration theory. 26 The samples were analyzed to trace the origins of the tribe by comparing DNA of its members with that of other groups. 
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potentially extremely undesirable effects on their community. 36 The Havasupai objected to the schizophrenia research, claiming that it could stigmatize their tribe. They were offended by the inbreeding paper, because apart from stigmatization it caused major concern based on their cultural belief that inbreeding brings harm to one's family. Further, they were shocked by the population migration study, because its conclusions contradicted their belief that they had originated in the Havasu canyon and were assigned to be its guardian.
37
The Havasupai filed several notice-of-claim letters. They contended that the improper use of their blood samples had invaded both their personal privacy and the 'cultural and religious privacy' of the tribe and had caused them severe harm, extreme distress, and emotional trauma. In addition, they claimed that this misconduct had resulted in growing mistrust of medical care, because many tribe members now feared going to the health clinic, seeking medical attention, or providing blood samples for medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Gewijzigde veldcode
Act went into effect. 43 Moreover, an exclusive focus on these types of harm may push other risks out of sight. For instance, while the possibility of physical harm arising from biobank research is usually rejected out of hand, it is quite conceivable that research participants could suffer indirect physical harm when they are exploited and consequently lose their trust in the medical profession. The Havasupai case is an appropriate example, because, as was emphasized during the proceedings, the improper use of their samples left many blood donors afraid of going to the health clinic, seeking medical attention, or providing further blood samples for medical diagnosis or treatment.
44
Yet other tangible harms may arise, even harms affecting a whole community, from certain forms of research. In the case of Native American tribes that enjoy extensive sovereignty, being labeled with a stigmatizing condition could result in downgrading the community's bond rating, making it more difficult to obtain financing. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ233/pdf/PLAW-110publ233.pdf. 44 Havasupai Tribe (n 31) 1069. 45 In 1979, findings of a research study examining the alcohol intake of the Inupiaq residents of Barrow were misinterpreted by reporters as showing that they were irresponsible alcoholics. As a result, the Inupiaq community's bond rating was reduced and funding for key projects denied. See EF Foulks, 'Misalliances in the Barrow Alcohol Study ' [1989] 2(3) Am Indian Alsk Native Ment Health Res 18; Carol E Kaufman and Saumya
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Another concern, that was explicitly voiced by one of the Havasupai leaders, is that legal entitlements might be threatened when, as was the case with the population migration study, genetic tests reveal that the tribe did not originate in its current location. 
The concept of dignitary harm
Apart from the abovementioned 'non-obvious' but potentially formidable tangible harms, biobank research can also lead to severe intangible harms. Our focus here is on socalled 'dignitary harms'. In the context of the topic of this paper, these are at issue when research participants are not respected as persons but are treated in denial of the respect of their humanity and used merely for the ends of others. Irrespective of other, palpable negative effects that may result from biobank research, these harms arise from the fact that participants
were not treated with the dignity and respect they deserve. 47 More specifically, dignitary harms involve infringement upon the autonomy, privacy, and moral integrity of the research participants. As persons, they have an inalienable right to decide for themselves and to act upon their decisions without outside interference; they are entitled to a personal sphere free However, in a great many of cases, the only harm is the affront to the plaintiff's dignity as a human being, the damage to his self-image, and the resulting mental distress.') from public attention and intrusion; and they deserve respect for who they are and for the values, preferences and commitments they subscribe to.
Why should we care about dignitary harms?
As has been forcefully argued by bioethicist Julian Savulescu with regard to the use of leftover body material for research purposes: Moreover, having one's body material used for purposes one is morally opposed to may make one feel morally complicit. 'Moral complicity' refers to the idea that one can do wrong by being associated in some way with wrongdoing by others, for example by causally contributing to others' wrongdoing in a certain way or by increasing the likelihood of the wrongdoing occurring even without causing it in any way. 50 Allowing people to avoid moral complicity is an additional reason for avoiding dignitary harms in research.
The fact that dignitary harm usually cannot be proven (unlike for example physical harm) is not a convincing reason to disregard it. According to the majority opinion of the instance, information gleaned from donated biological samples reinforced the racial stereotype that Native Americans are unusually susceptible to certain types of disease.
Perhaps even more detrimental than external stereotyping is the risk of cultural harm, which may eventually lead to community disruption. 54 Biobank research that undermines cultural and spiritual beliefs may indeed be devastating to the self-understanding of the community. In the Havasupai case, the self-representation of the group was severely disturbed in at least three ways. The schizophrenia study was based on the presumption that the alleged Dignitary harm can also result from violations of trust. In the Havasupai case, despite promises that the blood samples would remain with the ASU researchers, the fact that the researchers sent samples to researchers at other institutions and that the latter researchers also published papers that stigmatized the Havasupai was disrespectful, as the ASU researchers violated the trust that tribe members had placed in them.
Further, biobank sample providers and their relatives may suffer dignitary harm if their cell lines are immortalized, patented or commercialized without their knowledge or approval, 58 or if samples that they invest with religious significance are tampered with, lost or not returned after the research is finished. In the Havasupai case, for instance, the tribal belief that blood continues to retain the essence of the individual and must be buried after death to let the spirits rest, explains the interest of the tribe in having the remaining blood samples returned. 
Important lessons from the Havasupai case
The Havasupai case seems to hold at least three valuable lessons for current biobank research practices. First, researchers need to ensure that they understand and take full consideration of the interests and concerns of their research participants. Finally, the example of the Havasupai shows that so much might be at stake for the participants that they should be allowed a right to withdraw consent and have their samples returned or destroyed. Only by withdrawing consent can they be enabled to call a halt to possible infringements upon their dignity and only by having their samples returned can they prevent further research that might be objectionable or -if religious significance is invested in the sample -restore the physical integrity of the tissue source.
Limitations of federal regulations in preventing dignitary harms in biobank research
Apart from revealing that biobank research may lead to so-called dignitary harms that enshrined in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, its provisions aim to protect the safety, welfare, and dignity of human research participants.
The Code of Federal Regulations requires researchers to obtain informed consent from research participants and approval of the research protocol by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), an ethics committee set up to oversee research involving human participants. As a rule, potential research participants have to be provided with a written consent form that includes easily understandable information about the exact purpose of the research, the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits, and the confidentiality procedure that will be followed.
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Before the research can go ahead, an IRB has to review the protocol to ascertain that adequate information will be given and that the anticipated benefits of the research justify its risks.
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However, federal regulations allow for waiver of informed consent when the IRB determines that the research involves no more than minimal risk to the participants, the waiver will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the participants, and the research could not practicably be carried out without it. 71 Research is even totally exempt from IRB review and consequently from the obligation to obtain informed (re)consent if it involves only the collection or study of existing data or specimens which are publicly available or where the information is recorded by the researcher in a way that participants cannot be identified To what extent did the Havasupai research violate these federal regulations? Apart from infringing upon basic research requirements, Markow took advantage of the fact that some provisions on informed consent left room for interpretation. Admittedly, the purpose of the research project, as set forth in the oral script and the written consent form used during the first blood draw series, was defined broadly enough to include behavioral disorders such as schizophrenia. However, contrary to Markow's opinion, 74 this did not mean that the Havasupai had adequately consented to the study of schizophrenia. After all, informed consent is not simply a signature on a form, but rather a process of information exchange. The scope of consent is defined on the basis of the overall information provided to the potential research participants. 75 Since in both the discussions with the tribal council and the communication with the individual participants, only diabetes research was mentioned, the fact that the scope of the project was defined more broadly in the consent form was not decisive. Moreover, the meaning of the consent form must be viewed from the perspective of the research participant, not from the viewpoint of the researcher. 76 If research participants understood the vaguely formulated project description to encompass only the study of 73 
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information
diabetes, then no valid consent could be inferred for research that, while formally within the scope of the definition, went beyond this interpretation.
Aside from the inadequate disclosure of information, doubts can be raised about the manner and context in which information was conveyed. More likely than not, the presentation of the scope of the project was not adapted to the capacities of the blood donors.
Most of the Havasupai who were approached to give blood had no tertiary education and many were even barely literate in English. 77 As became apparent during the second blood draw series, when the number of educated and motivated contributors diminished drastically, the information presented in the consent form proved too confusing. Potential donors were very hesitant to participate and only agreed to do so after the research purpose was explained to them in the simplest of terms and the written consent form was dropped altogether.
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The Havasupai case is not only an example of biobank research misconduct in which researchers disregarded the rules or bent them to their own advantage. More importantly, the wide variety of unanticipated harms that participants were confronted with serves as a caution that current federal regulations may be inadequate. Indeed, while intended to protect the interests of research participants, some of its provisions inadvertently leave the door open for similar infringements.
The regulations concerning secondary research on samples which are not individually identifiable may prove especially problematic. As noted earlier, this kind of research is exempt from IRB review and, consequently, from the obligation to (re-)obtain informed consent. The rationale presumably is that no harm can be done if individual participants remain anonymous. However, as was clearly demonstrated in the Havasupai case, major harm may befall research participants when their samples are coded but are known to originate 77 Rubin (n 9).
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within a particular population. In those circumstances, research that yields findings that are stigmatizing and disruptive may result in severe collective harm, reflecting negatively on all group members. It is highly disturbing to realize that even if ASU researchers had followed the regulations by the book, the population migration research that proved most damaging for the participants could have gone ahead. To prevent such an outcome from occurring again, the samples returned instead of destroyed. It would not make any difference if the samples were to be made irrevocably anonymous, as is sometimes proposed instead of destruction.
As the Havasupai experienced to their detriment, protections provided under the Common Rule, even when honored in practice, are not always adequate to avoid severe infringements upon the dignity of biobank research participants. Instead of merely encouraging researchers by way of recommendations, the federal regulations governing biobank research need to be updated to guarantee due consideration of dignitary interests that researchers may find difficult to identify. The safeguards built into the Common Rule still are too much indebted to the informed consent doctrine that was originally developed in the therapeutic setting. Indeed, its provisions do not yet sufficiently address the protection of parties that can be affected apart from the individuals directly participating in research. In addition, by focusing almost exclusively on health, safety, and welfare risks, they lose sight of less palpable harms that can prove to be even more problematic.
In order to be better adapted to the interests of biobank research participants, the Common Rule needs to be revised in a number of ways. To begin with, the concept of harm should be broadened to account for dignitary harms to individual participants, third-parties and groups, including possible harms resulting from research on anonymized samples. 
Limitations of current tort doctrine in providing relief from dignitary harms in biobank research
The Havasupai case also reveals that present common-law tort doctrines are largely unhelpful to protect research participants when dignitary harms actually occur. Theoretically, tort law offers several causes of action on which biobank research participants may proceed, including breach of informed consent, breach of fiduciary trust, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 89 In practice, however, these remedies prove to be largely illusory.
Breach of informed consent
Courts have consistently declined to acknowledge a claim for breach of informed consent brought by biobank research participants against researchers. In the Havasupai case, for instance, the District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed this claim because in its opinion the consent for drawing blood was not made ineffective even if it was fraudulently procured. 90 Even in cases where judges have opted for a less conservative interpretation of the informed consent doctrine, they decided that biobank research participants did not have standing to sue for breach of informed consent. As with other torts based in negligence, the tort of informed consent requires a breach of duty, an injury and a causal connection between the duty that was breached and the injury. 
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Regulations. 99 Acknowledging that these regulations require protective measures on the part of investigators and research institutions, courts have insisted that violations would only allow the funding agency to impose penalties or even withdraw federal funds, but would not mandate enforcement through private litigation. 100 Indeed, parties that benefit from a government contract are assumed to be no more than incidental beneficiaries unless the contract explicitly focuses on them and provides them with an actionable right. 101 Since this intent is clearly absent in the Code of Federal Regulations, courts have denied biobank research participants a basis for judicial remedy in case researchers disregard the regulatory requirements for informed consent.
Breach of fiduciary duty
A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty proves to be similarly ineffective in protecting biobank research participants. As was the case in the Havasupai lawsuit, biobank research participants have argued that they put special trust in their researchers and even perceive them as fiduciaries. 102 In their view, biobank researchers must be held to the highest standard of care, put the interests of their research participants before their personal interests and at least protect them from unreasonable harm.
However, courts have emphasized that biobank researchers are not fiduciaries of their research participants for largely the same reasons that they have dismissed a duty of informed consent on their part. They have found the fiduciary doctrine only to be applicable to the strictly medical context, where the physician is acting primarily for the benefit of the patient. owe their participants a duty of special care and are found to be in breach of this duty, plaintiffs would have a very hard time demonstrating that they suffered an injury that not only qualifies under present tort doctrine but had unquestionably been caused by the negligent conduct of defendants.
Avenues for modifying tort doctrine to protect biobank research participants
It seems that existing tort law must be substantially revised to address kinds of mistreatment that are specific to the biobank research context and result in injuries that affect the autonomy and dignity of participants without demonstrable physical damage. Two potential avenues can be identified to achieve this goal. The first approach involves an expansion of existing remedies, while the second focuses on the development of a distinct dignitary tort.
Expanding existing remedies
In an attempt to offer biobank research participants an opportunity to recover for infringements upon their autonomy and dignity, a three-pronged proposition to modify existing tort remedies may be considered. […] Rather, the injury was to plaintiff's personal dignity and right of privacy, an injury for which an award of damages generally is considered appropriate. The primary concern in this injury to the personality is vindication of valuable, although intangible, right, the mere invasion of which constitutes harm for which damages are recoverable.') 113 In Diaz v Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a group of about 5,000 women brought a class action suit against the hospital that subjected them to research in a new method for fetal lung maturity treatment during their prenatal care. Plaintiffs claimed that, although they had signed the informed consent document informing them that they would be subjected to a treatment method that was not the regular standard of care, their consent was invalid because it was obtained in a coercive atmosphere and because the forms were written in language that they could not possibly understand. the first litigation to have produced a substantial monetary award to biomedical research participants who did not assert a claim of physical injury.
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Thirdly and relatedly, the negligence doctrine could be modified to ease the burden of proof on biobank research participants to demonstrate that they suffered dignitary harm, because the difficulties in proving this kind of harm would otherwise likely be insurmountable.
Introducing a new dignitary tort
A second avenue for improving protection of the autonomy and dignity of biobank research participants would be for courts to accept a distinct dignitary tort. 116 The need for an explicit recognition of a genomic tort claim based on an interest in dignity has been forcefully advocated by several commentators. 117 Relying on a conception of human dignity as If a 'right to be treated with dignity' -whether as part of a broad concept of privacy or based on international ethics codes -were to be recognized, research participants who have not been physically harmed would be provided with a distinct dignitary tort to sue researchers without having to establish the elements of negligence. 126 To begin with, it would no longer be necessary to demonstrate that the researchers were subject to a fiduciary duty that had been breached. Moreover, biobank research participants would no longer have to prove that they automatically result in compensable injury, an explicit judicial recognition that infringing upon the dignity of biobank research participants constitutes damage in itself, would no longer be necessary.
However, creating a 'dignitary tort' would also appear to have significant drawbacks.
If a 'dignitary tort' were to be recognized by the courts, it would inevitably extend beyond the sphere of research on human body material. Therefore it would be difficult to prevent it from interfering with ordinary human interactions.
To ensure that the likelihood of dignitary harms occurring in the context of research on human subjects is reduced or avoided, it would seem necessary to follow the first avenue we identified, involving creating appropriate statute law and amending the CFR as argued above.
In order to provide research participants with access to appropriate redress when dignitary harm does occur, existing tort remedies should be modified. First, a fiduciary relationship between researchers and the persons on whose body material they carry out research should be recognized. Second, dignitary harms should be acknowledged to be actionable harms. 127 Third, since dignitary harm may not result in physical injury or 127 In this regard, the opinion voiced by the appellate court in the Havasupai case seems to offer a signpost. By way of obiter dictum, the judges considered that dignitary torts such as those alleged by the Havasupai tribe do not require proof of physical manifestation of emotional suffering or distress, because these torts have to be considered damage in themselves. As regards dignitary torts, the Court of Appeals emphasized that injury need not be established because it is presumed. See Havasupai Tribe (n 31) 1081. The majority explicitly refers to the fact that, in dignitary torts such as invasion of privacy, cognizable injury is presumed. In addition, they refer to Dan Dobbs' contention that a dignitary tort is said to be damage in itself. Expanding on the concept of dignitary torts, Dobbs writes that 'a violation of a dignitary right is harm in itself. Here the idea does not seem to be that the plaintiff really has pecuniary loss and that the only problem is proving it. Nor does it seem to be that the plaintiff has actual substantial emotional harm that is unproven. Rather the idea seems to be that some rights are 'valuable' in an important although intangible way, even if their loss does not lead to either pecuniary loss or 49 emotional distress, the required burden of proof as to the existence, but not necessarily the extent, of dignitary harm, should be low.
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Conclusion
With human tissue research entering the era of large-scale genomic biobanking, new ethical and legal challenges arise in reconciling societal interests relating to the production of scientific knowledge with the interests and concerns of research participants. As the Havasupai case painfully illustrates, this delicate act of reconciling different sorts of interests and concerns should not be restricted to the safety, ownership and confidentiality considerations that dominate much of the present discussions. Indeed, especially but not exclusively in research on vulnerable populations, important so-called dignitary interests may also come into play. The Havasupai case holds particularly valuable lessons regarding appropriate consent requirements, the level of protection offered by anonymization procedures, and the scope of participants' right to withdraw consent.
The challenges arising from the emerging field of biobank research urgently need more adequate consideration. In order to reduce the likelihood of research participants suffering dignitary harm, the Code of Federal Regulations needs to be revised along the lines suggested above. This on its own, however, will not allow research participants to obtain redress in relation to any harm they suffer. Therefore, other steps are necessary. Since we compensable emotional harm. The invasion of such a right is harm for which damages are recoverable.' See Dobbs (n 52) 625. Since the case was eventually settled, it remains unclear whether these considerations would have been legally decisive if the case had been fully litigated.
128 Lowering the burden of proof as to the existence of dignitary harm(s) would make it easier for the complainant to be heard in full trial. Clearly, the size of any award made by the court would have to be based upon the extent and severity of the dignitary harm(s) as established by testimony.
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believe the creation of a distinct new 'dignitary tort' to be fraught with problems, we recommend instead an expansion of the availability and extent of existing tort remedies. First, a fiduciary relationship between researchers and the persons on whose body material they carry out research should be recognized. Second, dignitary harms should be acknowledged to be actionable harms. Third, the required burden of proof as to the existence of dignitary harms should be low.
